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The Master’s Tools? A Feminist Approach to Legal and Lay Decision-Making 
Vanessa E Munro1 
 
It is neither possible, nor desirable, within the confines of this chapter to purport 
to offer any kind of ‘instruction manual’ for doing feminist legal research. Instead, 
my aim in the following discussion is to give a brief sketch of key theoretical 
contributions that feminist analyses have made to our understandings of, and 
expectations in relation to, law and legal process.2 Having done so, I explore some 
of the ways in which feminist methods can be deployed in empirical socio-legal 
research, 3  and highlight in particular its utility in the context of studying the 
parameters, content and dilemmas of lay (and quasi-legal) decision-making. As 
part of this discussion, I also draw attention to some of the tensions that can arise 
in meeting the demands of access and impact associated with this genre of 
research whilst preserving the critical and deconstructive spirit of feminism.  
 
A Tentative Mapping of (Some) Feminist Theoretical Terrain  
 
This chapter inevitably starts with a hefty disclaimer: there is no such thing as a 
unified feminist jurisprudence nor a universally shared feminist legal method. 
Aligned under the banner of modern feminism are a diversity of perspectives 
regarding the causes and consequences of unequal gender power relations, the 
ways in which the law and state have played a role in their creation and 
maintenance, and the most effective strategies for their eradication.  
 
                                                        
1 Professor of Law, University of Warwick. I am grateful to the ESRC and Nuffield Foundation for 
funding the research discussed in this chapter, and to Louise Ellison, Sharon Cowan and Helen Baillot 
without whose collaboration the projects would not have been possible. 
2 For more detailed discussion of the contribution of feminist accounts of knowledge and epistemology 
to the research process within the social sciences, see, for example, S. Hesse-Biber & M. Yaiser (eds.) 
Feminist Perspectives on Social Research (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), G. Letherby 
Feminist Research in Theory and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), or C. Ramazanoglu, 
Feminist Methodologies: Challenges and Choices (London: Sage, 2002). 
3 For a broader discussion of the application of different methods to ‘feminist’ social science research, 
see S. Reinharz, Feminist Methods in Social Research (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), and J. 
Ribbens & R. Edwards, Feminist Dilemmas in Qualitative Research: Public Knowledge and Private 
Lives (London: Sage, 2009). 
For some feminist commentators, women’s disproportionate exclusion from 
positions of political, economic and social power, and their concomitant relegation 
to private and domestic spheres, reflects an historical legacy of patriarchal 
privilege that is gradually being eroded by initiatives for equality and non-
discrimination. That this is so, proponents argue, is evidenced – amongst other 
things – by the increasing numbers of women securing positions of power within 
the public sphere. But for other feminists, there are more entrenched systems of 
structural disempowerment that continue to operate notwithstanding some 
women’s ability to successfully ‘cheat’ the system. Assimilation of women into an 
unchanged male-defined sphere, or as Iris Young puts it “coming into the game 
after it has already begun, after the rules have been set, and having to prove 
oneself according to those rules and standards,” is not a tenable blueprint for 
genuine equality. 4  Instead, what is required, they argue, is a radical 
deconstruction of the boundaries between public and private spheres and a de 
facto revolution in the dynamics of gender power.5 Whilst greater recognition and 
valuation of women’s biological and existential connection to care has been 
posited by some feminists as the route to securing such empowerment for 
women,6  for others any valorisation of this propensity for care serves only to 
entrench women’s disempowerment, tying them to the domestic sphere and 
affording them status only on the basis of men’s valuation of their care-giving.7  
 
Under-cutting these debates, moreover, have been conflicting understandings of 
the nature of power and a diversity of perspectives regarding the ways in which 
gendered experiences are reinforced, challenged or overshadowed by myriad 
‘other’ identity markers (including race, class, disability and sexual orientation),8 
                                                        
4 I. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990) at 164 
5 See, in particular, C. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses in Life and Law (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1987); C. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of State (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1989). Also A. Scales, ‘The Emergence of a Feminist Jurisprudence’ (1986) 
95 Yale Law Journal 1371; and M. Minow, ‘Justice Engendered’ (1987) 101 Harvard Law Review 10.  
6  C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1982); V. Held, Feminist Morality: Transforming Culture, Society and Politics 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993). 
7 C. Mackinnon, above note 5; R. West, ‘Jurisprudence and Gender’ (1988) 55 University of Chicago 
Law Review 1; D. Rhode, Justice and Gender (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982). 
8 K. Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalising the Intersectionality of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics’ in A Phillips (ed.), Feminism and 
Politics (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998); A. Harris, ‘Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal 
as well as by our differential levels of exposure to vulnerability and divergent 
opportunities to access institutional and inter-personal resources for resilience.9   
 
But to focus too much on these feminist ‘fault-lines’ risks disintegrating any basis 
for collective action and dismissing the experientially powerful connection that 
many women share with others on account of their gender. Thus, much recent 
feminist work has focussed instead on identifying points of commonality in the 
midst of this diversity10 and on highlighting the extent to which contemporary 
feminism can rarely be neatly classified exclusively within the bounds of any one 
conventional ‘liberal’, ‘cultural’, ‘radical’ or ‘postmodern’ typology.11 In line with 
this, I have previously argued that it is possible to identify certain ‘resemblances’ 
that unite, albeit at times precariously, and often strategically, what are broadly 
(self) identified as feminist approaches to law and legal reasoning.12  
 
Focussing on the use of feminist legal methods to examine processes and 
outcomes of lay decision-making, in the remainder of this chapter, I will draw 
attention to, and build upon, three such feminist ‘resemblances’ in particular: 
namely, (1) a rejection of abstraction and commitment to the importance of 
context; (2) a sceptical approach towards claims of law’s rationality and 
neutrality; and (3) a reflective attitude towards the role of power and the limits of 
law as a mechanism of social control. But before exploring how these basic 
premises impact upon, and frame the application of, feminist legal methods in 
particular contexts, I will first say a little more about what they each entail.    
 
1. A Suspicion of Abstraction, and Commitment to Context:  
                                                        
Theory’ (1990) 42 Stanford Law Review 581; M. Mahoney, ‘Whiteness and Women, In Practice and 
Theory: A Reply to Catharine MacKinnon’ (1993) 5 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 217; M, Frug, 
Postmodern Legal Feminism (London: Routledge, 1992). 
9 For further discussion, see in particular, M. Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in 
the Human Condition’ (2008) 20 (1) Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 1. 
10  N. Lacey, Unspeakable Subjects: Feminist Essays in Legal and Social Theory (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2008); J. Conaghan, ‘Re-Assessing the Feminist Theoretical Project in Law’ (2000) 27(3) 
Journal of Law and Society 351. 
11 See, for example, M. Davies & V. Munro (eds.) The Research Companion to Feminist Legal Theory 
(Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2013). 
12 V. Munro, Law and Politics at the Perimeter: Re-Evaluating Key Debates in Feminist Theory (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2007). 
 Common to much feminist work is an insistence that social and legal problems 
cannot be understood by techniques that require abstraction - not only because 
such abstraction obscures important detail about the concrete particularities of 
people’s daily lives, but because it can disguise the operation of problematic 
power relations. Key thinkers in mainstream liberal political theory – including 
John Rawls 13  and Ronald Dworkin 14  – have been criticised from a number of 
quarters for developing sterile frameworks for justice and rights that require the 
removal of social actors from their everyday environments. 15  In contrast, a 
prominent theme amongst many feminists has been the need to attend to context, 
to situate legal problems and to understand their purported solutions within the 
concrete relationships and situations that give them meaning. This requires 
paying attention to the law in action – how it is interpreted and applied - as much 
as, if not more than, the law in theory. It demands embracing the complexities and 
‘messiness’ of social interaction, and an understanding of the human individual as 
a fundamentally relational entity.  This is not to say that context and connection 
are universally perceived as empowering: relational constructions of femininity 
have been a source of both admiration and denigration, and the socio-economic 
disadvantages associated with women’s caring responsibilities have been 
significant. But it is to insist that living is a social phenomenon: relationships shape 
our identities, communities frame the parameters and meanings of our conduct, 
and, inevitably, the spaces, functioning and potential of law as a social 
phenomenon are determined by this.16  
 
2. A Rejection of the ‘Myths’ of Legal Rationality and Neutrality: 
 
                                                        
13 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971). 
14 R. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985). 
15 M. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); A. 
MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London: Duckworth, 1988); S. Okin, Justice, Gender 
and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989); C. Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1988). 
16 R. West, above note 7; E. Frazer & N. Lacey, The Politics of Community: A Feminist Critique of the 
Liberal-Communitarian Debate (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1983). 
 
It is also a common theme in much feminist legal theory that formalist assertions 
of law’s operation as a closed, coherent and distinctive system of reasoning, with 
its own language and methods, should be rejected. Alongside prominent Critical 
Legal Studies scholars,17 many feminists have insisted that the law, rather than 
being a seamless web of principles awaiting discovery through legal reasoning, 18 
is a patch-work of politically motivated choices, selected on the basis of their 
ability to support the status quo of (gender) power relations. Legal decision-
makers do not neutrally apply legal rules or interpret broader principles to 
decipher inevitable outcomes; on the contrary, they make partial (and often self-
interested) appraisals, which are retrospectively cloaked in the trappings of 
neutrality through constructed doctrines of precedent and natural justice.  
 
Building upon this, feminist work has often been marked by a commitment to 
uncover the politics of law’s operation, to highlight the biases of its agents, and to 
deconstruct the systems and discourses that disguise this as legal rationality. 
Striking incarnations of this critique can be found, for example, in a range of 
jurisdictionally-specific ‘feminist judgment projects’ in which commentators have 
taken on the role of ‘feminist judge’, using the rules and precedents available at 
the time to re-visit leading cases and explore the extent to which, with different 
choices, they might have been decided more progressively. Such projects, though 
operating from the ‘inside’ of law by adopting its pretensions to precedent and 
inductive reasoning, provide a powerful counter-illustration of the malleability of 
legal forms and expose the extent to which, behind a façade of neutrality and 
rationality, lies a complex amalgam of power, privilege and partisan 
perspectives.19 
 
                                                        
17 D. Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997); R. Unger, ‘The 
Critical Legal Studies Movement’ (1983) 96 Harvard Law Review 561. 
18 c.f. R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986). 
19 See, generally, the Women’s Court of Canada; Also R. Hunter, C. McGlynn & E. Rackley (eds), 
Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010); H. Douglas, F. Bartlett, 
T. Luker & R. Hunter (eds) Australian Feminist Judgments: Righting and Rewriting Law (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2015); K. Stanchi, L. Berger & B. Crawford (eds), Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Opinions 
of the United States Supreme Court (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); M. Enright & A. 
O’Donoghue (eds), Northern/Irish Feminist Judgments: Judges’ Troubles and the Gendered Politics of 
Identity (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017).  
 
3. A Mindfulness of the Power, and the Limits, of Law:  
 
Though feminist legal theorists, by definition, are interested in the ways in which 
law shapes and legitimates patterns of gender relations, there is a shared 
ambivalence regarding the extent to which law as a form of social ordering has the 
capacity to create meaningful change. For the most trenchant critics of the liberal 
state, the law is deeply implicated within patriarchal structures, operating to 
legitimate and disguise the myriad violent consequences that they etch upon the 
lives, and bodies, of women.20 And yet, at the same time, the impulse to resort to 
the law – to use ‘the masters’ tools’21 – in order to campaign for and bring about 
reform has a measure of irresistibility. Whether selective critical amnesia or a 
pragmatic concessionary tactic, feminists have typically been reluctant to 
abandon altogether what Carol Smart referred to as ‘the siren call of law’,22 and 
have often continued to engage with the state in pursuit of legal reforms. But, for 
many feminists, this process has been marked by an appreciation of the dangers 
of ceding too much power to law as a form of knowledge and control. It has been 
emphasised that feminist-driven reforms, even when prima facie achieved within 
legal frameworks, are at perpetual risk of co-option, capture or undoing by more 
regressive political, economic and social forces in the process of their translation 
and application; and that the attendant encroachment of legal authority upon 
women’s lives may have damaging effects.23  
 
Lay Decision-Making: A Feminist Testing Ground 
 
Feminists have engaged with the ‘legal’ in a variety of contexts and spaces, but lay 
decision-making provides a particularly apt terrain for feminist analyses that 
                                                        
20 C. MacKinnon, above note 5. 
21 A. Lorde, Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches (Berkeley: Crossing Press, 2007). 
22 C. Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (London: Routledge, 1989) at 160. 
23 See, for example, K. Bumiller, In an Abusive State: How Neoliberalism Appropriate the Feminist 
Movement (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008); V. Munro, ‘Violence Against Women, ‘Victimhood’ 
and the (Neo)Liberal State’ in M. Davies & V. Munro (eds), above note 11; V. Munro, ‘Shifting Sands: 
Consent, Context and Vulnerability in Contemporary Sexual Offences Policy in England and Wales’ 
(2017) Social and Legal Studies; but c.f. J. Halley, Split Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break from 
Feminism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
 
emphasise the relevance of concrete context, the discretionary nature of legal 
outcomes, and the ways in which ‘non-legal’ factors influence the application and 
impact of legal rules. In the rest of this chapter, therefore, I focus on a series of 
studies that my colleagues and I have conducted, which were designed to explore 
and critically evaluate the mechanics, processes and outcomes of lay (or, at most, 
quasi-legal) decision-making in relation to rape, across two distinct areas of legal 
functioning, namely criminal justice and asylum. In a context in which many 
feminists have pointed to the regulation of sexuality – both the regimes that 
determine the parameter of acceptable and unacceptable intrusion, as well as the 
social tropes about (hetero)sexual desire, mating conventions and 
(mis)communication that inform them - as a litmus test for gender relations,24 
these studies raise crucial insights about women’s embodied experiences under 
the law, as well as about the ways in which decision-makers cement, enforce, 
challenge and resist the law’s application of patriarchal norms and structures.  
 
In the discussion below, I will first provide a brief account of the research 
questions, and methods of data collection and analysis, that drove these studies, 
before moving on to reflect more broadly on the extent and ways in which, 
consciously or otherwise, they can be characterised as ‘feminist’; and on the 
advantages and disadvantages that such an orientation has brought to bear.  
 
(i) Jury Decision-Making in Criminal Rape Trials:  
 
Across a series of three consecutive ESRC funded projects, the first of which was 
conducted in 2003, my co-investigators and I have explored the ways in which 
(mock) jurors approach the task of deliberating towards a unanimous verdict in 
contested rape trials, exposing the factors that influence the content, direction and 
                                                        
24 S. Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1975); S. 
Lees, Carnal Knowledge: Rape on Trial (London: Penguin, 1993);C. MacKinnon, above note 5; L. 
Gotell, ‘Rethinking Affirmative Consent in Canadian Law: Neoliberal Sexual Subjects and Risky 
Women’(2008) 41 Akron Law Review 865; L. Gotell, ‘Reassessing the Place of Criminal Law Reform 
in the Struggle against Sexual Violence’ in A. Powell, N. Henry & A. Flynn (eds.) Rape Justice: Beyond 
the Criminal Law (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015); S. Cowan, ‘Freedom and Capacity to Make a 
Choice: A Feminist Analysis of Consent in the Criminal Law of Rape’ in V. Munro & C. Stychin (eds.) 
Sexuality and the Law: Feminist Engagements (London: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007). 
 
dynamics of those deliberations. Each of these projects had its own distinctive 
focus – the first explored the approach taken by jurors to a complainant who was 
intoxicated at the time of the alleged assault, and examined the extent to which 
evaluations of credibility and responsibility might be affected by the means by 
which she became intoxicated, the nature of the intoxicating substance, and the 
level of the defendant’s intoxication.25 The second study explored the extent to 
which providing jurors with ‘myth-busting’ education (through expert evidence 
or extended judicial direction) might impact the tone and direction of 
deliberations involving complainants who displayed what might otherwise be 
regarded as counter-intuitive behaviours, namely, failing to physically resist the 
attacker, failing to report the attack immediately to the police, and failing to 
appear emotionally distraught whilst giving testimony in the courtroom.26 And, 
most recently, the third study explored whether, and in what ways, the fact of a 
complainant giving testimony with the benefit of ‘special measures’ (either a 
screen in the courtroom, a live video-link, or pre-recorded evidence-in-chief) 
influenced jurors’ perceptions of her credibility and attendant verdict outcomes.27 
 
But individually and collectively, these projects were also engaged in the broader 
enterprise of charting and interrogating the ways in which popular 
understandings of what rape looks like, expectations in relation to ‘normal’ 
heterosexual mating and dating behaviour, and attributions of responsibility for 
sexual (mis)communication influenced the substance and outcome of jury 
deliberations. 28  Moreover, in a context in which observation of, and research 
                                                        
25 E. Finch & V. Munro, ‘Breaking Boundaries? Sexual Consent in the Jury Room’ (2006) 26(3) Legal 
Studies 303; E. Finch & V.Munro‘The Demon Drink and the Demonised Woman: Socio-Sexual 
Stereotypes and Responsibility Attribution in Rape Trials Involving Intoxicants’ (2007) 16(4) Social & 
Legal Studies 591. 
26 L. Ellison & V. Munro, ‘Reacting to Rape: Exploring Mock Jurors’ Assessments of Complainant 
Credibility’ (2009) 49(2) British Journal of Criminology 202; L. Ellison & V. Munro, ‘Turning Mirrors 
into Windows? Assessing the Impact of (Mock) Juror Education in Rape Trials’ (2009) 49(3) British 
Journal of Criminology 363. 
27 L. Ellison & V. Munro, ‘A Special Delivery? Exploring the Impact of Screens, Live Links and Video-
Recorded Evidence on Mock Juror Deliberation in Rape Trials’ (2014) 23(1) Social & Legal Studies 3.  
28 L. Ellison & V. Munro, ‘Better the Devil You Know? ‘Real Rape’ Stereotypes and the Relevance of a 
Previous Relationship in (Mock) Juror Deliberation’ (2013) 14 International Journal of Evidence & 
Proof 299; L. Ellison & V. Munro,‘A Stranger in the Bushes or an Elephant in the Room? Critical 
Reflections on Received Rape Myth Wisdom in the Context of a Mock Jury Study’ (2010) 13(4) New 
Criminal Law Review 781; L. Ellison & V. Munro, ‘Of ‘Normal Sex’ and ‘Real Rape’: Exploring the 
Use of Socio-Sexual Scripts in (Mock) Jury Deliberation’ (2009) 18(3) Social & Legal Studies 1. 
about the content of, ‘real’ jury deliberations is prohibited by the Contempt of 
Court Act 1981, they provided a glimpse into the discursive dynamics of that 
process, the ways in which jurors communicate and defend their conclusions to 
peers, the significance of verdict polls, the impact of the presence of a ‘strong’ 
foreperson, and the relevance of gender and other socio-demographics.29  
 
In each study, a similar method was adopted to simulate and collect deliberation 
data. Jury service eligible participants were recruited from the general public and 
asked to observe a real-time re-enactment of one of a series of scripted mini-rape 
trials that were modified in line with isolated study-relevant variables. Scripts for 
the trials were created in consultation with a number of criminal justice 
practitioners, and actors and barristers were recruited to play key roles within the 
re-enactments. After observing the ‘trial’, participants were provided with a 
judicial direction, crafted in accordance with prevailing Bench Book guidance, and 
then streamed off into juries of 8 to deliberate towards a unanimous, or failing 
that (and only after 75 minutes) majority, verdict. Deliberations were audio- and 
video-recorded, and then transcribed for analysis. Elsewhere in this collection, 
Mandy Burton gives further details regarding the mechanics by which we 
gathered our deliberation data in these studies, and reflects upon their merits and 
demerits, as well as their potential to mitigate the chasm of verisimilitude that has 
often plagued vignette-based simulation studies.30 
 
(ii) Home Office Decision-Making in Asylum Rape Claims: 
 
Credibility is frequently acknowledged as the first (and most significant) hurdle 
to be overcome in the process of successfully securing asylum status,31 and it is 
                                                        
29 L. Ellison & V. Munro, ‘Telling Tales: Exploring Narratives of Life and Law within the (Mock) Jury 
Room’ (2015) 35(2) Legal Studies 201; L. Ellison & V. Munro, ‘Getting to (Not) Guilty: Examining 
Jurors’ Deliberative Processes in, and Beyond, the Context of a Mock Rape Trial’ (2010) 30(1) Legal 
Studies 74. 
30 For further discussion, see also E. Finch & V. Munro, ‘Lifting the Veil: The Use of Focus Groups & 
Trial Simulations in Legal Research’ (2008) 35 Journal of Law & Society 30. 
31  International Association of Refugee Law Judges (2013) ‘A Guide on the Assessment of Credibility 
in International Protection Procedures’ available at: 
http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/content/international-association-refugee-law-judges-guide-
assessment-credibility-international. For further discussion on the challenges of establishing credibility, 
see also M. Kagan, 'Is Truth in the Eye of the Beholder? Objective Credibility Assessment in Refugee 
well-established that a large proportion of women seeking asylum in the UK will 
have, or at least will claim to have, experienced sexual violence in the context of, 
or as part of their reason for, fleeing from their lives in their home countries.32 
Against this background, this project – funded by Nuffield - examined the ways in 
which asylum decision-makers handle and evaluate claims of sexual violence 
made as part of women’s claims for refugee status. It explored parallels with the 
criminal justice system, where presumptions regarding what constitutes a 
credible victim account are similarly marked by expectations of coherent 
narratives and complete recall, notwithstanding the disassociative effects of 
trauma experienced by complainants;33 but it also highlighted the distinctive ways 
in which cultural and linguistic factors, and the existence of a ‘politics of disbelief’, 
may entrench barriers to being heard and believed in asylum decision-making.34 
 
The study involved over 100 semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders, 
including immigration judges, Home Office case officers and presenting officers, 
solicitors specialising in asylum and immigration, interpreters involved in asylum 
proceedings, and NGO / support organisations. In addition, we undertook a series 
of observations of First Tier Tribunal appeal hearings across a number of UK sites, 
focussing particularly on cases involving female appellants who had previously 
disclosed an allegation of rape. During these observations, the researcher took 
detailed notes (often verbatim) of the statements made by Home Office presenting 
officers and Immigration Judges, as well as counsel for the applicant (where 
present) and – far more infrequently – the applicant herself. The researcher also 
recorded her observations regarding the overall environment of the tribunal 
                                                        
Status Determinations' (2003) 17(3) Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 367; D. Bögner, C. Brewin 
& J. Herlihy, ‘The Impact of Sexual Violence on Disclosure during Home Office Interviews’ (2007) 
191(7) British Journal of Psychiatry 75; J. Herlihy, P. Scragg & S. Turner, ‘Discrepancies in 
autobiographical memories-implications for the assessment of asylum seekers: repeated interview study’ 
(2002) 7333 British Medical Journal 324.  
32  Asylum Aid, Unsustainable: The Quality of Initial Decision-Making in Women’s Asylum Cases 
(London, Asylum Aid, 2011); London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine & Scottish Refugee 
Council (2009) Asylum Seeking Women, Violence and Health (London: LSHTM & SRC, 2009); Refugee 
Council Briefing,‘The Experiences of Asylum-seeking Women and Girls in the UK’ (London: Refugee 
Council, 2012). 
33 H. Baillot, S. Cowan & V. Munro, ‘Reason to (Dis)Believe? Evaluating the Rape Claims of Women 
Seeking Asylum in the UK’ (2014) 10 (1) International Journal of Law in Context 105. 
34 H. Baillot, S. Cowan & V. Munro, ‘Hearing the Right Gaps: Enabling & Responding to Disclosures 
of Sexual Violence within the UK Asylum’ (2012) 21(3) Social & Legal Studies 269. 
centre and hearing room, and the apparent demeanour of, and interaction 
between, participants. In a number of the cases where tribunal appeals were thus 
observed, the research team were also able to secure access to surrounding case 
file documents, including Home Office refusal letters and final tribunal decisions. 
This provided a valuable context within which to understand the appeal 
proceedings in the given case, as well as the overall asylum application journey.  
 
 
The substantive findings of all these studies have been discussed in detail 
elsewhere, and the aim in this chapter is not to replicate that discussion. Instead, 
in what follows, I aim to reflect specifically on the ways in which these studies 
might be seen to be ‘feminist’ in their orientation, and on the additional insights 
that this theoretical and methodological approach brought to bear upon their 
findings. In addition, though, I highlight some of the ways in which their feminist 
ambitions were frustrated somewhat by the politics and pragmatics of research 
design, and more broadly by the inevitable tensions of using ‘the masters’ tools’.  
 
Mastery, Tools and Methods: Some Feminist Reflections 
 
At the heart of each of these projects was a fundamental commitment to ‘asking 
the woman question’35 – that is, to uncovering and subjecting to critical scrutiny 
the ways in which legal frameworks impact upon the lives and experiences of 
women. Though they often also cast light on the handling and evaluation of men’s 
allegations of sexual violence (which can in themselves be an appropriate subject 
matter for feminist analysis and insight), women were the primary focus – partly 
as a consequence of the statistically disproportionate levels of sexual violence 
perpetrated upon women, and partly because the interconnections between 
victimisation, (hetero)sexualisation, and femininity ensure that this continues to 
represent the paradigm of gender power. But – of course – not all research that is 
interested in women’s experiences can, or should, be assumed to be feminist. 
                                                        
35 K. Bartlett, ‘Feminist Legal Methods’ (1989) 103 Harvard Law Review 829; L. Finley, ‘The Nature 
of Domination and the Nature of Women: Reflections on Feminism Unmodified’ (1988) 82 
Northwestern University Law Review 352. 
‘Asking the woman question’ may be the fundamental starting point for much 
feminist research, but it is by no means a solely determinative feature: resultant 
data regarding women’s experiences must also be situated within broader 
contexts of (gender) power relations, and so too the precariousness of the 
constructions of ‘reason’ and ‘normality’ upon which these relations are often 
legitimised by powerful stakeholders must be subjected to critical scrutiny.36 
 
Jurors in criminal rape trials are specifically directed by the judge to apply their 
‘combined good sense, experience and knowledge of human nature and modern 
behaviour’ (R v Olugboja (1981) 73 Cr App R 344) in evaluating the credibility and 
probative weight of the testimony with which they are presented, and in applying 
their individual and collective renderings of ‘what took place’ to determine a 
defendant’s liability. This ‘lay’ perspective is often juxtaposed against ‘legalistic’ 
rationality as part of a broader narrative by which the centrality of the jury to the 
pursuit of a socially accountable justice is defended. At the same time, however, 
the unbridled nature of ‘popular wisdom’ has provoked much anxiety in the sexual 
offences context where research highlights the existence of problematic public 
perceptions regarding women’s ‘appropriate’ (that is, non-provocative) sexual 
and social behaviour, and demanding expectations regarding the ‘normal’ 
responses of ‘genuine’ victims in terms of physically resistance, immediate 
reporting, and so on. 37  The ESRC projects outlined above track the scale and 
impact of this ‘common sense’ understanding of sexual assault on the dynamics 
and outcomes of jury deliberation. They evidence the limited power of legal 
doctrine – specifically through the imposition of a test of objectively reasonable 
rather than subjective belief in consent (s.2 Sexual Offences Act 2003) - to shift the 
balance of responsibility for negotiating and communicating sexual desire from 
the complainant to the defendant in the minds of lay decision-makers. Moreover, 
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they highlight the tenacity of jurors’ impulse to ‘fill in the gaps’ in the narratives 
provided by witnesses, often by relying on personal experiences and unfounded 
presumptions, and to cushion the excesses of hetero-normative sexuality with 
tropes regarding the ease with which signals can be misinterpreted as consent.  
 
In the criminal justice context, it has long been debated whether evidence of 
similar preoccupations on the part of police and prosecutors are best attributed 
to personal or institutional biases in progression decision-making, or to pragmatic 
predictions of the likelihood of conviction based upon projections of jurors’ likely 
perspectives in these regards. But what is clear is that such ‘common sense justice’ 
infiltrates and informs the bureaucratic machinery of the criminal justice process, 
and often in ways that reduce the prospects of redress for a number of rape 
complainants. Though the asylum study referred to above emerges in a quite 
different political, procedural and probative context, its findings also clearly 
illustrated the extent to which presumptions regarding gender and cultural 
norms, as well as the bounded parameters of political activity vis-à-vis ‘mundane’ 
sexual aggression, influenced – and often determined - the outcomes of asylum 
decision-making, irrespective of formal rules and protocols. A lower burden of 
proof is required in asylum contexts, designed to give applicants the benefit of the 
doubt, in recognition of the difficulties that are often encountered in providing 
objective evidence to corroborate narratives of persecution and predictions of 
future threat. Despite this, and notwithstanding the at least formally non-
adversarial structure of first instance and appeal asylum decision-making, this 
study highlighted parallels with the criminal justice system’s handling of rape in 
relation to the suspicion encountered by complainants who failed to conform to 
expectations in terms of demeanour, behaviour before or after the alleged attack, 
ability to provide detailed and consistent retrospective accounts, and so on. A 
suspicion that was compounded by a political climate – both in the Home Office, 
and in the UK more generally - in which asylum-seekers are seen as presumptively 
untrustworthy, and a ‘problem’ to be managed and contained by state officials.  
 
To this extent, both of these projects transcend the immediate parameters of a 
focus on women’s experiences, and the dynamics of sexual domination 
specifically, to contribute broader feminist insights regarding the limited impact 
of legal doctrine, the scale and impact of discretion and bias in the application of 
‘legal’ decision-making, and the ways in which the operation of legal structures 
cannot be meaningfully detached from social contexts and political agendas. The 
asylum research in particular also highlighted – within the confines of an 
empirical study – the necessity of consciously engaging with the intersectionality 
of women’s gendered experiences of ‘violence’, ‘protection’ and ‘voice’. But there 
are other key ways in which a feminist sensitivity to the role and relevance of 
power, relationality and context also played out in these studies to produce 
additional insights. More specifically, these studies – in different ways – 
highlighted the impossibility of detachment and impartiality in the face of others’ 
narratives of abuse, particularly when one is tasked with the responsibility for 
attributing blame and bringing about life-changing consequences in their light.  
 
The bureaucratic structures of the asylum process, as much as the investigative 
and adversarial protocols of the criminal justice system, promote the myth of 
‘professional’ distance and deliberative neutrality. For feminists, such pretensions 
send alarm bells ringing, and these studies should strengthen their volume. In the 
jury studies, notwithstanding the fact that participants knew that their 
involvement in deliberations was ‘mock’, there was considerable evidence that 
jurors experienced stress as a consequence of observing the trial, negotiating with 
peers towards a collective verdict, and returning that judgment upon the parties 
before them. Disbelief was suspended to the extent that several jurors commented 
on how emotionally difficult they had found the deliberation process, noting that 
they felt a burden of responsibility for determining the fate of the defendant and 
complainant, and suggesting – for example – that they “won’t sleep tonight” as a 
consequence. There is every reason to suspect that in a ‘real’ trial, where jurors 
are exposed to greater amounts of evidence, much of it potentially graphic and 
brutal, over an extended period marked by numerous disruptions and delays, and 
are required to reach a verdict upon which there is no doubt that very real 
consequences will befall the trial parties, the emotional labour referred to by our 
mock participants will be particularly acute;38  and yet, jurors continues to be 
selected at random, provided with very little information regarding what is 
expected of them and directed at the end of their service that to talk about their 
experiences in the jury room again would be a contempt of court for which they 
may face punishment. This has ramifications both for the ethical treatment of lay 
participants within the criminal justice system, and for our appreciation of the 
ways in which – under such emotional pressure – jurors may become increasingly 
susceptible to coping strategies that demonise or depersonalise trial participants, 
or invoke cognitive shortcuts in order to expedite their emotional exposure.39  
 
Similarly, in the asylum study, a prominent theme that emerged from the 
interview data was the extent to which quasi-legal decision-makers, employed by 
the Home Office to interpret and apply the provisions of the Refugee Convention 
and associated doctrine but often without formal legal qualifications, struggled to 
manage the emotional labour involved in being exposed to, and deliberating upon, 
narratives of abuse on a recurring basis. The institutional and political context in 
which asylum decision-making takes place, moreover, increased the sense of 
‘burn-out’ and ‘compassion fatigue’ exhibited by a number of participants, and 
threatened to significantly reduce the prospects for justice for individual asylum-
seekers. Home Office personnel were seen, in some – but not all – cases to 
disengage from the specifics of each narrative, viewing them – collectively – as 
‘stories’ that should be met with presumptive suspicion. What was also apparent 
in this study, and amplified when cast through a feminist lens that is mindful of 
the politicised nature of personal experience and the significance of relationship 
and community to personal identity, was the ways in which the background of the 
interpreter in asylum proceedings can have a considerable impact not only upon 
the applicant’s experience of the process and her prospects for being able to ‘tell 
her story’ effectively and convincingly, but also upon the interpreter, and his/her 
emotional well-being in this interaction. Interpreters – many of whom will have 
come from the same community as the applicant, and may have experienced, or 
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known family and friends who experienced, the dynamics of persecution that the 
applicant recounts – often reported high levels of emotional upset as a 
consequence of their professional involvement, with several commenting that 
they had been reduced to tears after hearings. Meanwhile, it was apparent that – 
for applicants – the cultural and political orientation of the interpreter (whether 
actual or surmised) made a crucial difference to their ability to recount 
experiences openly. This served, in many cases, to increase the emotional 
challenges already experienced by applicants who are being asked (often on a 
repeated basis) to narrate traumatic events to satisfy others’ evaluation, in 
unfamiliar and frequently intimidating bureaucratic or tribunal environments.40   
 
In both contexts, then, when the veil of law’s pretence at neutrality and rationality 
is – at least partially - lifted, the inherently emotional nature of criminal justice 
and asylum decision-making, for quasi-legal professional and lay participants 
alike, begins to emerge; and with it arises a raft of questions regarding how best 
to acknowledge and attend to that emotionality, and support decision-makers in 
managing it effectively and productively, in ways that ultimately increase rather 
than reduce the prospects for a just outcome. In these respects, both studies are 
indebted to, and influenced by, feminist theories and methods, and can be seen to 
go beyond merely ‘asking the woman question’ in specific legal contexts, in order 
to uncover surrounding power dynamics and their relational ramifications.   
 
But there are also some important ways in which these projects perhaps fell short 
of their feminist methodological ambitions. The primary focus of the Nuffield 
study was an exploration of the bases upon which adjudicators assessed 
credibility and made decisions in relation to women’s asylum claims. But to the 
extent that the processes through which this reasoning was channelled also had 
profound experiential impacts upon both decision-makers and claimants, the 
absence of women’s voices is lamentable. Women’s experiences were represented 
in this study, but they were mediated in interviews through the lens of NGO 
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support workers’ and others’ interpretations, and the paper-based format and 
intimidating environment of the appeal tribunal entailed that women’s voices 
were rarely directly heard in this forum. The research team took a conscious 
decision – grounded on ethical and pragmatic considerations – not to conduct 
interviews with women claimants, but this does diminish the texture with which 
their experiences can be discerned in the study, and raises important questions 
about representation, authenticity and voice for feminist purposes. But this is a 
restriction that also speaks to some of the broader methodological dilemmas – 
discussed below - that can be faced in conducting feminist empirical legal 
research, in particular as a consequence of the need to make strategic concessions 
to gatekeepers, and / or to make the substance of the research ‘useful’ (which also 
perhaps entails being palatable) to those with the power to bring about reform.  
 
Feminist Dilemmas: Access, Impact and What Lies Between 
 
The power dynamics underpinning empirical research are often complicated. In 
many cases it involves negotiating with gatekeepers to identify minimally 
intrusive mechanisms for securing access to required data, and satisfying 
stakeholder participants of the impartiality of the researchers, the rigour of the 
analysis process, and the uses to which the resultant outcomes will be put. From 
the outset, these considerations can jar against feminist critical conventions, 
requiring an abstraction of research questions from the political context in which 
they originate, and an assertion of ‘neutrality’ – or at least a postponement of 
partiality – within the data collection and analysis process. Feminist researchers 
are often faced, therefore, with the choice of either being at least partially 
complicit in reaffirming artificial understandings of the social world, including the 
processes of engaged social research, or failing altogether to secure the empirical 
data with which to uncover, challenge – and seek to reform – problematic social 
behaviours. Navigating through this dilemma may involve a strategic ‘softening’ 
of feminist edges. So too, at the end of the research process, whilst the 
achievement of ‘impact’ is often a precarious matter embedded within 
institutional and political vagaries beyond the control of the researcher, 
maximising ‘pathways to impact’ may entail – to some extent at least - a re-
packaging of findings into concepts and remedial mechanisms that the ‘legal 
community’ already acknowledges, and can more readily digest and action, even 
where the harms and solutions suggested by the data sit somewhat askew.   
 
In many senses, of course, this is just a replication in the research context of the 
broader dynamics and challenges encountered in rendering women’s 
perspectives intelligible to powerful (typically male) elites. In the legal 
environment, these difficulties are amplified, moreover, by the tenacious 
insistence upon myths of legal rationality, abstraction, and neutrality, which 
feminist work often deconstructs and yet cannot be allowed to entirely move 
beyond. And in the legal academy, there is reason to suspect that the tensions 
which this can generate will become even more acute, as increased emphasis is 
placed upon the need to ensure that the products of research are ‘useful’ to and 
liable to generate ‘impact’. Whilst such impact can be felt amongst a variety of 
constituencies within the community, where research outcomes are directed at 
bringing about reforms to existing legal institutions, processes and practices, it 
entails a delicate negotiation of power relationships with those individuals or 
organisations with the imputed capability to agitate for, or secure, such reforms. 
What is more, it often involves a strategic forgetting of work that deconstructs this 
simplistic and linear model and its implicit assumption that any such legal reforms 
will in turn ensure predicable and effective changes in underlying social practices. 
 
In much the same way as with feminist legal theory more broadly, then, feminist 
(empirical) legal researchers may ultimately have little choice but to consciously 
‘play the game’. In the process of ensuring access to data and maximising the 
impact of our findings, this may, at times, require participating in the perpetuation 
of half-truths about what the law is, how it operates, and what capacity it has to 
bring about social change; but staunchly refusing to do so, for all the critical 
integrity it might bring, may frustrate and potentially paralyse our impulse for 
pragmatic improvements in the pursuit of social justice. The challenge, then, is to 
be mindful of the trade-offs that researchers make in this context, of why we make 
them, the ways in which they skew our analysis, and of what is otherwise at stake. 
 
